Attended and unattended regions of the image array are viewed often as binary complements to one another, with a well-defined boundary between them. A simple experiment shows otherwise: if the contour of a simple convex shape is perturbed to create a distinctive texture, it is typically the outside of the contour that provides the basis for similarity judgement, not the inside. The introduction of the appropriate task, however, can make the inside part of the contour become more salient. A similar result occurs for concave shapes, such as a C, where notions of containment are not easily specified. These observations suggest that figure boundaries are difficult to define objectively and that the setting of an attentional reference frame plays a key role in object description. We propose that this frame is part of a virtual, transparent blackboard or "clearboard", bound to the scene, not to the image.
INTRODUCTION
The natural world is usually conceived as being composed of different objects such as chairs, dogs or trees. This conception carries with it a notion that objects occupy a region of space, and consequently have an "inside". By default, things not within this region of space are considered "outside" the object. Thus, the lungs of a dog are inside the dog, but the chair occupies a different region and is outside the object dog. When an object is projected into an image, these simple notions lead to what appears to be a clear disjunction between what is considered figure and what is ground. Customarily, the figure is seen as the inside of the imaged shape as defined by its bounding contours (i.e., its silhouette). The region outside this boundary is ground (Mumford et al., 1984) . This implies that, at any given moment, the points of an image are either figure or ground. Such a view is reinforced by reversible figures, such as Rubin's vase-face or Escher's patterns of birds and fish. This view carries the notion that, at any instant, the figural region has a well-defined boundary.
Here, we show that such a simple disjunctive distinction between figure and ground is incorrect. Before offering experimental observations, we would like to first point out that the assignment of a figural boundary to a region of an image is an ill-posed problem. Consequently, if a figure has an ill-defined boundary, then it should not be surprising thai the attended image region may have fuzzy boundaries. The ambiguity in defining a precise region of the image as the subject of attention arises in part because many objects in the world do not have clearly defined boundaries. These include fractal objects such as clouds, fire and many particle systems. Although such objects occupy a region of space, the inside and outside regions of this space are uncertain. Even non-fractal objects present difficulties in defining clear bounding contours.
For example, what is inside and what is outside of a fir tree? Does it include the region between the branches where birds might nest, or the air space between the needles? If we attempt to be quite literal, then perhaps only the solid parts define, the tree's exterior. Clearly, such a definition is not consistent with our conceptual view of the fir tree which includes roughly everything within its convex hull. One's intuition is that the bird is inside this convex hull, just as if it were contained within an escapable cage with the bars spaced too far apart. Clearly, issues of scale are critical to any formal definition of insideness. (For example, air might penetrate a piece of toast and hence lies inside, but whether any of the butter lies inside is less clear.) Our aim here is not to offer a definition of inside, but simply to point out that our own notions of insideness seem heavily dependent on inferring a boundary to objects. However, just how one should construct such boundaries is not a well-defined procedure. The result will depend on the spatial scale chosen, as well as a smoothness constraint imposed on the object. However, the imposition of such 1493 FIGURE 1. Fir tree at several scales of resolution. What is inside the tree?
a) b) c)
FIGURE 2. The notion of "what is figure" does not require that the figure be a region enclosed by a visible contour. In (a), the x is seen to lie within the C, and is associated with the figure; whereas in (b), the x lies outside the figure. In (c), the answer is unclear.
smoothing scales is largely subjective, typically depending on the task at hand. Hence, if an object's boundary is ill-defined, it should not be surprising that the region of figural attention is also. In support of this conjecture, we present observations which show that there are some regions of the figural image that are receiving more attention than others. Along the way, we use these demonstrations to clarify how figural assignments are given to image regions and how attentional reference frames are created in the process. The ambiguity of just what is considered inside a figure and just what is considered outside is highlighted. These results then lead us to review the notion of "hole", which is shown to be a concept tied to an attentional reference frame. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings to visual and computational perception. We also introduce the notion of a frame curve to help explain how we might cope with the ambiguity of object boundaries.
FUZZY BOUNDARIES
Typically, figure-ground assignments are disjunctive, as in the bird/fish Escher drawings. However, as previously mentioned, when the image of a fractal-like object is considered, the exact boundary of the image shape is unclear and depends upon the scale used to analyze the image (Fig. 1) . For the finest scale, perhaps the finest details are explicit, such as the needles of a spruce or the small holes through which a visual ray can pass unobstructed. However, at the coarsest scale, most fractal objects including trees will appear as a smooth, solid convex shape. Any definition of the region of attention and its frame must address this scale issue. Consider then, the following definitions.
Definition 1 (Region of Attention)
The region of attention is that collection of structures (not necessarily image-based) that currently are supporting the analysis of a scene.
Definition 2 (Attentional Frame)
The attentional frame for a region under attention is a coordinate frame within which the attended structures can be organized.
By these definitions, we mean to imply that the perceiver is trying to build or recover the description of an object (or scene) in the world, and his informationprocessing capability is focused on certain regions in the scene that are directly relevant to this task. [Here, we exclude explicitly image-based representations in favor of something like Marr's (1982) 2½ D Sketch.] The precise regions of the scene that are being analyzed, and their level of detail, will be set by the demands of the goal in mind. Such a definition implies that the regions of the scene assigned an attentional frame may not have a welldefined, visible contour. Indeed, by our definition, these regions could be disconnected and need not be spatially coherent! It has long been known that humans concentrate the processing of images in certain regions or structures of the visual array (e.g. Noton & Stark, 1971; van Voorhis & Hillyard, 1977) . Attention has several forms: one of them, perhaps the most obvious, is gaze. We cannot explore a stationary scene by swinging our eyes past it in continuous movements. Instead, the eyes jump with a saccadic movement, come to rest momentarily and then jump to a new locus of interest (see Yarbus, 1967) . These observations suggest the following.
Claim 1
The region of the image currently under directed attention may not have a well-defined boundary earmarked by a visible image contour.
In support of this claim, consider the C of Fig. 2 . Although the image contour by itself is well defined, the region enclosed by the C is not. The region "enclosed" by the "C" is a legitimate processing chunk. For example, if one asks the question does the "X" lie inside the C, our immediate answer is yes for case (a) and no for case (b). To make this judgement, the visual system must evaluate the size of the interior region of the C. Thus, by our definition, the concept "inside of C" must lead to an assignment of certain pixels of the display as the region of attention. Without an explicit contour in the image, however, where should one draw the boundary between the region under attention? For example, should we choose to close the attentional region with a straight line between the two endpoints? Another possibility would be to find a spline that completes the curve in such a way that the tangent at the two endpoints of the C is continuous for the complete figure. These findings agree with a model in which the boundary is something more closely approaching a "blurred" version of the C, as if a large Gaussian mask were imposed on a colored closed C. We contend (3 FIGURE 3. (Top row) Use the middle pattern as reference. Most see the left pattern as more similar to the reference. This could be because it has a smaller number of modified corners (with respect to the center) than the right one and, therefore, a pictorial match is better. (Second row) In this case, the left and right stars look equally similar to the center one. This seems natural if we consider that both have a similar number of corners smoothed. (Third row) Most see the left pattern as more similar despite the fact that both left and right have the same number of smoothed corners with respect to the center star. Therefore, in order to explain these observations, one cannot base an argument on just the number of smoothed corners. The position of the smoothed corners needs to be taken into account, i.e., preferences are not based on just pictorial matches. Rather, here the convexities on the outside of the patterns seem to drive our similarity judgement. (Third and fourth rows) When such three contours are closed, a preference exists which depends for most on the side used to close the contour. Use the center shape as reference in both rows. As in the example of the previous figure, most favor the outer portions of the shape to judge similarity. A distance metric, based solely on a pictorial match which does not take into account the relative location of the different points of the shape, cannot account for these observations.
that such "fuzzy" attentional boundaries occur not only within regions that are incompletely specified, such as that within the incomplete dosing of the C, but also within regions that appear more properly defined by explicit image contours.
To further clarify our definition of the attentional region and its frame, note that it is not prescribed by the retinal image, but rather by the collection of image structures in view. Any pixel-based definition tied exclusively to the retinal image is inadequate, for it will not allow attentional (and processing) assertions to be made by a sequence of fixations of the object. Rather, a structure-based definition of an attentional frame presumes that the observer is building a description of an object or event, perhaps by recovering object properties (Noton & Stark, 1971; Palmer, 1989) . The support required to build these object properties is what we define as the attentional region. This support corresponds closely to Ullman's incremental representations (Ullman, 1985) upon which visual routines may act, and consequently the operations involved in attentional assertions should include such procedures as indexing the subregions, marking these regions, and the setting of a coordinate frame (Palmer et al., 1988) . We continue with some simple observations that bear on these problems.
OUTSIDE IS MORE SALIENT THAN INSIDE
When binary attentional assignments are made for an image shape with a well-defined, simple closed contour, such as an "0", the assignment is equivalent to partitioning the image into two regions, one lying inside the contour, the other outside. For such a simple shape as the "0", the immediate intuition is that it is the inside the contour which is given the attentional assignment, and this does not include any of the outside of the contour.
[See Hoffman & Richards (1984) , for example, where shape descriptors depend on such a distinction.] By our definition, however, the attentional region might also include at the very least a small band or ribbon outside the contour, simply because contour analysis demands this. As a step toward testing this notion, namely that a ribbon along the outer boundary of the shape should also be included when attentional assignments are made, we perturb the contour to create simple textures, such as those illustrated in Fig. 3 .
In this figure, let the middle star pattern be your reference. Confirming our intuition, the top row shows that the greater the number of pointed comers, the more similar the star pattern to the reference. As corners are rounded, the patterns become less similar to the reference and more like each other. Hence, in the middle row, FIGURE 5. (Left) Alligator image after processing to obtain a silhouette. (Center) Silhouette with frame curve superimposed, computed by a smoothing technique described elsewhere (Subirana-Vilanova, 1990 , 1993 . (Right) The regions outside the frame curve are now highlighted in black. Note that these regions correspond closely to the salient parts.
where each left and right pattern has an equal number of pointed and rounded corners, they appear similar to each other and different from the middle reference star. However, in the bottom row, again an equal number of corners have been rounded in the left and right patterns, yet now most observers will pick the left pattern as being most similar to the middle star.* The difference is simply that in the left pattern the intrusions have been smoothed, whereas in the right pattern it is the protrusions which are smooth. Clearly, the similarity judgement places more weight on the protrusions, which are seen as sharp convex angles in the reference pattern. The inner discrepancy is almost neglected. The same conclusion is reached even when the contour has a more part-based flavor (Hoffman & Richards, 1984) , rather than being a contour texture, as in Fig. 4 . Here, a rectangle has been modified to have only two protrusions. Again, subjects will base their similarity judgments on the shape of the convex portion of the protrusion, rather than the inner concavity.
This result is not surprising if shape recognition is to make any use of the fact that most objects in nature can be decomposed into parts. The use of such a property should indeed place more emphasis upon the outer portions of the object silhouette, because it is here that the character of a part is generally determined, not by the nature of its attachment. Almost all attachments lead to concavities, such as when a stick is thrust into a marshmallow. Trying to classify a three-dimensional object by its attachments is usually misguided, not only because many different parts can have similar attachments, but also because the precise form of the attachments is not reliably visible in the image. Hence, the indexing of parts (or textures) for shape recognition can proceed more effectively by concentrating on the outer extremities (Kanizsa & Gerbino, 1967; Huttenlocher & Wayner, 1990) .
Another possible justification for such observations is that, in tasks such as grasping or collision avoidance, the *The results are virtually independent of the viewing conditions. However, if the stars sustain an angle larger than 10 deg, the preferences may reverse. A detailed experiment has not been made and the observations of the reader will be relied upon to carry our argument.
outer part is also more important and deserves more attention because it is the one that we are likely to encounter first. For example, in Fig. 3 (bottom) , the center and left stars would "hurt" when grasped, whereas the right star would not, because it has a "smooth" outside.
The outer region of a shape is thus more salient than its inner region. This implies that the region of scene pixels assigned to the attentional region places more weight on the outer, convex portions of the contour than on its interior concave elements (or to interior homogeneous regions) and leads to the following claim.
Claim 2
The human visual system assigns a non-binary attentional function to scene pixels, with greater weight given to regions near the outside of shapes, which become more salient.
Note that this claim simply refers to "regions near the outside", not to whether the region is convex or concave. In Fig. 4 , the outer portion of the protrusion contains a small concavity, which is presumably the basis for the figural comparison.
Exactly what region of the contour is involved in this judgment is unclear and may depend upon the property being assessed. All we wish to claim at this point is that whatever this property, its principal region of support is the outer portion of the contour. The process of specifying just which image elements constitute this outer contour is still not clear, nor is the measure (nor weight) to be applied to these elements. One possibility is an insideness measure. Such a measure could be computed easily as a function of the distance of the image elements to the "smoothed" version of the contour (a circle in Fig. 3 and something close to a rectangle in Fig. 4) . In this context, the smoothed contour corresponds to the notion of frame curves as used in SubiranaVilanova (1991 SubiranaVilanova ( , 1993 .
This leads us to the following definition of frame curve which has to be read bearing in mind claim 1:
Definition 3 (Frame Curve)
A frame curve is a virtual image curve which lies along "the center" of the attentional region's boundary. THE INSIDE-OUTSIDE DILEMMA 1497 FIGURE 6. Star patterns with "holes" treat the inside ring of the shape as if this ring were an occluding shape, i.e., as if it were independent from the surrounding contours, even if one perceives a donut-like shape.
In general, the frame curve can be computed by smoothing the silhouette of. the shape. This is not always a well-defined process, because the silhouette may be illdefined or fragmented and because there is no known way of determining a unique scale at which to apply the smoothing. Figure 5 (center) shows a frame curve for an alligator computed using a scheme presented in detail elsewhere (Subirana-Vilanova, 1990 , 1993 . This frame curve is thus a simple first approximation to locating a boundary for the attentional region. On the right, the regions of the shape that are "outside" the frame curve have been colored; note that these regions do not intersect and they correspond closely to the outer portions of the different parts of the shape. As mentioned above (claim 2), these outer portions are those more likely to be of immediate interest.
INSIDE IS MORE SALIENT THAN OUTSIDE
Consider once more the lower row of three-star patterns of Fig. 3 . Imagine now that each of these patterns is expanded to occupy 20 deg of visual angle (roughly your hand at a distance of 30 cm). In this case, the inner protrusions may become more prominent and now the left pattern may be more similar to the middle reference pattern. (A similar effect can be obtained if one imagines trying to look through these patterns, as if in preparation for reaching an object through a hole or window.) Is this reversal of saliency simply due to a change in image size, or does the notion of a "hole" carry with it a special weighting function for attentional assignments?
For example, perhaps by viewing the central region of any of the patterns of Fig. 3 as a " hole", the specification of what is outside the contour has been reversed. Claim 2 would then continue to hold. However, now we require that pixel assignments to "the attentional region" be gated by a task-dependent, higher-level cognitive operator which decides whether an image region should be regarded as an object "hole" or not.
Again, with the middle pattern as reference, typically subjects will pick as most similar the adjacent pattern to the right. This is surprising, because these patterns generally are regarded as textured donuts, with the innermost region a hole. However, if this is the case and our previous claim is to hold, then the left pattern should have been most similar. The favored choice is thus where the inner star pattern were viewed as one object occluding another. Indeed, if we now force ourselves to take this view, ignoring the outer pattern, then the right patterns are again more similar, as in Fig. 3 . So in either case, regardless of whether we view the combination as a donut with a hole, or as one shape occluding part of another, still we use the same portion of the inner contour to make our similarity judgment. The hole of the donut thus does not act like a hole. The only exception is when we explicitly try to put our hand through this donut hole. Then the innermost protrusions become more salient as previously described for "holes". These results lead to the following claim.
Claim 2 (revisited)
Once the attentional region and its frame are chosen then, depending on the task, a sign is given to radial vectors converging or diverging from the center of this frame (i.e., the focal point). If the vector is directed outward (as if an object representation is accessed), then the outer portion of the encountered contours is salient. If the vector is directed inward' to the focal point (as if a passageway is explored), then the inner portion of the contour becomes salient.*
In the star patterns that we discussed earlier (see Fig.  3 ), the attention was focused primarily on the stars as whole objects. That is, there is a center of the figure that appears as the "natural" place to begin to direct our attention. The default location of this center, which is to become the center of a local coordinate frame, seems to be, roughly, the center of gravity of the figure (Richards & Kaufman, 1969) . Attention is then allowed to be directed to locations within this frame. Consider next the shapes shown at the top of Fig. 7 . Each ribbon-like shape has one clear center on which we first focus our attention. So now let us bend each of the ribbons to create a new frame center which lies near the inner left edge of each figure (Fig. 7, bottom) . Whereas, before, the left pattern was regarded as more similar to the middle reference, now the situation is starting to become confused. When the ribbons are finally closed to create the donuts of Fig.  6 , the favored similarity judgement is for the right pattern. The primary effect of bending and closing the ribbon seems to be a shift in the relation between the attentional frame and the contours. Following the center of gravity rule, eventually this center will move outside the original body of the ribbon. This suggests that the WHEN A HOLE IS NOT A HOLE Consider next the star patterns in Fig. 6 , which consist of two superimposed convex shapes, one inside the other. *Typically, if the size of the contours is very small (in retinal terms) then the outside is always more salient. But if the angular side is very large, the opposite becomes the default choice. judgments of texture similarity are dependent on the location of the attentional coordinate frame. Typically, as we move our gaze around the scene, the center of the coordinate frame will shift with respect to the imaged contours, thus altering the pixel assignments. A shift in the focus of attention without image movements can create an effect similar to altered gaze. More details regarding these proposed computations will be given in the next sections. What is important at the moment is that the saliency of attentional assignments will depend upon the position of the contour with respect to the location of the center of the attentional coordinate frame. The reader can test this effect himself by forcing his attention to lie either within or outside the boundary of the ribbons. Depending upon the position chosen, the similarity judgments change consistently with the revised version of Claim 2. This leads us to the last claim of the paper.
Claim 3
An attentional "coordinate" frame is imposed prior to constructing an object description for recognition.
As in Jepson & Richards (1992) , Subirana-Vilanova & Sung (1992) and Subirana-Vilanova (1993), we suggest that one of the most important roles of the attentional frame is to select and articulate the processing on the "relevant" structures of the image. The importance of selecting a coordinate frame early is to aid the indexing to a class of models (Corbalis, 1988; Humphreys, 1983; Jolicoeur, 1985) . Indexing can be based on the coarse description of the shape that the frame can produce or on the image features associated with the frame, or on transformations intrinsic to or allowed within the particular frame (Palmer, 1985 (Palmer, , 1989 Wiser, 1980) .
It is important to realize that as our gaze moves about the scene, the frame need not. In other words, we view the frame as bound to the scene, not t'o the image. It is as if there is a virtual, external transparent blackboard onto which we place the attentional coordinate frame and draw a frame curve [much like Ishii's (1994) clearboard]. If the frame moves, then so, consequently, will the assignment of scene pixels to (potentially) active image pixels. Our notion, then, is that the visual system first picks a (virtual) focal point in the scene, typically bounded by contours and, based on this focal point, defines the extent of the region (containing the focal point) to be included as the attended region. If all events in the selected region are treated as one object or a collection of superimposed objects, then the radially distant (convex) portions of the contours drive the similarity judgments and are weighted more heavily in the figural computations. On the other hand, if the choice is made to regard the focal point as a visual ray along which something must pass through (such as a judgment regarding the size of a hole), then the contours that lie radially the closest are given greater weight (i.e., those that were previously concave). This led us to the revised version of claim 2, namely that the attentional coordinate frame has associated with it either an inward or outward pointing vector that dictates which portion of a contour will be salient (i.e., outer vs inner). We have argued that the orientation of this vector is taskdependent.
Here we must introduce a cautionary note. We do not propose that the attentional frame is imposed upon a three-dimensional structure seen as an object. Such a view would require that object recognition [or a 2~/2 D sketch (Marr, 1982) ] had already taken place. Rather, our claim is that the attentional coordinate frame is imposed upon a (frontal plane) silhouette or region prior to recognition (see Claim 3) and is used to support the object recognition process, such as by indexing the image elements to a model. (Again, think in terms of an external virtual blackboard, or transparent "clearboard" onto which the visual machinery writes its assertions.) Hence, because a commitment is made to a coordinate frame and to the sign of its object-associated vectors (inward or outward), proper object recognition could be blocked if either the location of the frame or the sign of its radial vectors were chosen improperly. When a three-dimensional structure is obtained and analogous three-dimensional frames are imposed, similar claims are possible but they are not the subject of this section.
WHAT IS AN ATrENTIONAL FRAME?
Our least controversial claim is that the image region taken as the attentional frame depends upon one's goal. Reversible illusory patterns, such as the bird/fish Escher drawings or Rubin's face-vase, support this claim. The more controversial claim is that the "image" region taken as attentionai region does not have a boundary that can be defined solely in terms of an image contour, even if we include virtual contours such as those cognitive edges formed by the Kanizsa figures. The reason is two-fold: first, the focal position of our attentional coordinate frame with respect to the contours determines that part of the contour used in figural similarity judgments, implying that the region attended has changed or, at the very least, has been given altered weights. Second, whether the focal position is viewed as part of a passageway or alternatively simply as a hole in an object affects the figural boundary. In each case, the region is understood to lie within an object, but the chosen task affects the details of the region being processed. This effect is also seen clearly in textured C-shaped patterns and becomes acute when one is asked to judge whether X lies inside the C, or if Y will fit into the C, etc. The virtual boundary assigned to close the C when making such judgments of necessity will also depend in part upon the size of the second object, Y. To assert simply that the attentional window is that region lying inside an image contour misses the point of what the visual information processor is up to.
A simple experiment from the Rock laboratory demonstrates that the attentional window is not simply the entire region of the display, but rather a collection of scene elements. Some of the elements within this "attended" region may be ignored and, thus, may not be part of the structures at which higher level visual operations are currently being applied. Rock and Gutman (1983) showed two overlapping novel outline figures, one red and one green, for a brief period, e.g. 1 sec. Subjects were instructed to rate figures of a given color on the basis of how much they liked them (this attracts attention to one of the figures). Later they presented subjects with a new set of outline figures and asked subjects whether they had seen these figures in the previous phase of the experiment, regardless of their color. They found that subjects were very good at remembering the attended shapes but failed on the (overlapping) unattended ones. Although this experiment confounds memory for shapes with perceptual processing, the result suggests that the attended region is not simply a region of pixels, because the unattended figure was partly contained in an attended region and still did not support any high-level perceptual recall. Such operational definitions of "what is an attentional region?" thus seem fruitful ways of exploring how images are interpreted. Our definition is in this spirit and leads to a different view of the initial steps involved in the processing of visual images than those now in vogue in computational vision. This is the subject of the next two sections.
FIGU~ROUND AND ATrENTIONAL FRAMES
In classical perceptual psychology, "figure" has a well-defined meaning that is most closely associated with those image regions defined by "occluding" (as opposed to ground, which corresponds to a "partly occluded surface"). Therefore, the classical definition of figure (vs ground) is in terms of three properties: (1) it is perceived as closer to the observer; (2) it has the shape defined by the bounding contour; and (3) it occludes the ground.* Our latest claim introduces a complementary, mutually exclusive state to the attentional frame within which figural processing is presumed to occur. When the attentional vector is pointing outward, as in "object mode", this implies that the contour regions associated with the inward state of this vector should be assigned to a separate state.
Consider the following experiment of Rock and Sigman (1973) , in which they showed a dot moving up and down behind a slit or opening, as if a sinusoidal curve were being translated behind it. The experiments were performed with slits of different shapes, so that in some cases the slit was perceived as an occluded surface and in others as an occluding one. They found that the perception of the curve is achieved only if the slit is perceived as an occluded region and not when it is perceived as an occluding region. Using their terms, the "correct" perception is achieved only if the slit is part of ground but not when it is part of the figure. Using our terms, the attentional window has not changed but rather its attributes have, because the slit was viewed as a passageway between objects and not as an object with a hole. Note the difference between ground and attentional region.
In support of our view, another experiment by Rock and Gilchrist (1975) shows that the attentional window need not correspond to the occluding surface. In this second experiment, they showed a horizontal line moving up and down with one end remaining in contact with one side of an outline figure of a face. Consequently, the line in the display changes in length. When the line is on the inside of the face, most observers see it changing size, adapting to the outline; while when it is on the outer side of the contour, it is seen with constant length, but occluded by the face. This has been described as a situation in which no figure-ground reversal occurs. However, in our terms, the attentional window has changed, because the attended region changes. In the first case, the region of attention corresponds to the occluding surface and in the second, to the occluded one. Thus, the attentional window need not correspond to the occluding surface, even when the surfaces that are occluded are known. Our point is that the attentional frame and its subsumed region need not meet the classical criteria set out for the definition of figure (vs ground). To push this distinction between figure and frame still further, consider a figure-ground assignment in a situation where you are looking at the edge between two objects that do not occlude each other. For example, the grass in the border of a frozen lake or the edge of your car's door. What is ground in this case? Clearly, in these examples, there is not a well-defined foreground and background. Is figure the grass or is it the lake? These examples have been chosen carefully so that depth relations are unclear between objects. In these situations one simply cannot *S. Palmer pointed out to us the importance of the classical definition of figure/ground. assign figure-ground. What is puzzling is that the number of occasions where this happens is very abundant: a bottle and a cap, objects in abstract paintings, the loops of a metallic chain, etc. Yet, our proposal on attentional reference frames does not encounter difficulties with these situations, since depth, like object boundaries, is treated as a figure-ground attribute which need not be well defined in all cases. Depth measures, just like boundary measures, can be fuzzy. Therefore, to us, figure-ground and attentional frames are quite different concepts.
WHAT IS NEW
The fact that figure and ground reversals are attention related has been known for some time ).* However, there appears to be no precise statement of the relation between "figure" and notions of "inside" and "object". Nor has it been noted previously that, typically, it is the convex portions of image structures that support image analysis, with contour saliency changing when the task is changed, such as viewing a region as something to pass through, rather than as a shape to be recognised.t
These new observations support an operational definition of reference frames which are attention-dependent.
These frames are scene-based, not image-based, as if one were writing upon an external clearboard. We argue that it is the processing focus, not an image region typically defined as " figure" , that provides the key ingredient to constructing figural boundaries. This processing focus has a non-discrete fuzzy boundary and should not be tied directly to an image contour. This leads to the concept of virtual frame curve which can be used for shape segmentation in conjunction with inside/outside relations. These latter relations, in turn, have been shown to be dictated in part by task-dependent factors which set the sign of the principal direction assigned to the coordinate frame tied to the frame curve (i.e., inwards vs outwards).
We propose that such frames are set prior to recognition, which typically proceeds by the successive processing of convex chunks of image structures lying outside the frame curve.
